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Abstract
Hahn and Wallsten [1] wrote that network neutrality “usually means that broadband service providers charge
consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content
providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users.” In this paper we study the implications of
non-neutral behaviors under a simple model of linear demand-response to usage-based prices. We take into account
advertising revenues and consider both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios. In particular, we model the impact
of side-payments between service and content providers. We also consider the effect of service discrimination by
access providers, as well as an extension of our model to non-monopolistic content providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network neutrality is an approach to providing network access without unfair discrimination among applications,
content or traffic sources. Discrimination occurs when there are two applications, services or content providers that
require the same network resources, but one is offered better quality of service (shorter delays, higher transmission
capacity, etc.) than the other. How to define what is “fair” discrimination is still subject to controversy.5 A preferential
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5 The recent decision on Comcast v. the FCC was expected to deal with the subject of “fair” traffic discrimination, as the FCC ordered
Comcast to stop interfering with subscribers’ traffic generated by peer-to-peer networking applications. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit was asked to review this order by Comcast, arguing not only on the necessity of managing scarce network resources, but also
on the non-existent jurisdiction of the FCC over network management practices. The Court decided that the FCC did not have express statutory
authority over the subject, neither demonstrated that its action was ”reasonably ancillary to the [...] effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities”. The FCC was deemed, then, unable to sanction discriminatory practices on Internet’s traffic carried out by American
ISPs, and the underlying case on the “fairness” of their discriminatory practices was not even discussed.
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2treatment of traffic is considered fair as long as the preference is left to the user.6 Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) may have interest in traffic discrimination either for technological or economic purposes. Traffic congestion,
especially due to high-volume peer-to-peer traffic, has been a central argument for ISPs against the enforcement
of net neutrality principles. However, it seems many ISPs have blocked or throttled such traffic independently of
congestion considerations.
ISPs recently claimed that net neutrality acts as a disincentive for capacity expansion of their networks. In [2],
the authors studied the validity of this argument and came to the conclusion that, under net neutrality, ISPs invest
to reach a social optimal level, while they tend to under/over-invest when neutrality is dropped. In their setting,
ISPs stand as winners while content providers (CPs) are left in a worse position, and users who pay the ISPs for
preferential treatment are better off while other consumers have a significantly worse service.
ISPs often justify charging CPs by quantifying the large amount of network resources “big” content providers
use. On the other hand, the content a CP offers contributes to the demand for Internet access, and thus benefits the
access providers.
Many references advocate the use of the Shapley value as a fair way to share profits between the providers,
see, e.g., [4], [5]. One of the main benefits of this approach is that it yields Pareto optimality for all players,
and requires in particular that CPs, many of whom receive third-party income such as advertising revenue from
consumers’ demand, help pay for the network access that makes this new income possible.
In this paper, we focus on violations of the neutrality principles defined in [1] where broadband service providers
• charge consumers more than “only once” through usage-based pricing, and
• charge content providers through side-payments.
Within a simple game-theoretic model, we examine how regulated7 side payments, in either direction, and demand-
dependent advertising revenues affect equilibrium usage-based prices. We also address equilibria in Stackelberg
leader-follower dynamics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe a basic model and derive Nash equilibria
for competitive and collaborative scenarios. We consider potentially non-neutral side-payments in section III and
add advertising revenues in section IV, analyzing in each case how they impact equilibrium utilities. We study
an ISP offering multiple service classes in section V, and generalize our model in section VI to non-monopolistic
content or access providers. In section VII, we consider leader-follower dynamics. We conclude in section VIII and
discuss future work.
6 Nonetheless, users are just one of many actors in the net neutrality debate, which has been enliven [?] throughout the world by several
public consultations for new legislations on the subject. The first one, proposed in the USA, was looking for the best means of preserving a
free and open Internet. The second one, carried out in France, asks for different points of view over net neutrality. A third one is intended to
be presented by the EU during summer 2010, looking for a balance on the parties concerned as users are entitled to access the services they
want, while ISPs and CPs should have the right incentives and opportunities to keep investing, competing and innovating. See [7], [3], [6].
7 In the European Union, dominating positions in telecommunications markets (such as an ISP imposing side-payments to CPs at a price of
his choice) are controlled by the article 14, paragraph 3 of the Directive 2009/140/EC, considering the application of remedies to prevent the
leverage of a large market power over a secondary market closely related.
3II. BASIC MODEL
Our model encompasses three actors:
• the internauts (users), collectively,
• a network access provider for the internauts, collectively called ISP1, and
• a content provider and its ISP, collectively called CP2.
The two providers play a game to settle on their (usage-based) prices. The internauts are modeled through their
demand response.
Consumers are assumed willing to pay a usage-based fee (which can be $0/byte) for service/content that requires
both providers.
Denote by pi ≥ 0 the usage-based price leveed by provider i (ISP1 being i = 1 and CP2 being i = 2). We
assume that the demand-response of customers, which corresponds to the amount (in bytes) of content/bandwidth
they are ready to consume given prices p1 and p2, follows a simple linear model:
D = D0 − d(p1 + p2). (1)
With such a profile, we are dealing with a set of homogeneous users sharing the same response coefficient d to
price variations. Parameter D0 corresponds to demand for zero usage-based prices, which can be considered the
demand under pure flat-rate pricing assuming that the usage-based prices are overages on flat montly fees.
Demand should be non-negative, i.e.,
p1 + p2 ≤ D0
d
=: pmax.
Provider i’s usage-based revenue is given by
Ui = Dpi. (2)
A. Competition
Suppose the providers do not cooperate. A Nash Equilibrium Point (NEP) (p∗1, p
∗
2) of this two-player game
satisfies:
∂Ui
∂pi
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = D
∗ − p∗i d = 0 for i = 1, 2,
which leads to p∗1 = p
∗
2 = D0/(3d). The demand at equilibrium is thus D
∗ = D0/3 and the revenue of each
provider is
U∗i =
D20
9d
. (3)
B. Collaboration
Now suppose there is a coalition between ISP1 and CP2. Their overall utility is then Utotal := U1 + U2 = Dp,
and an NEP (p∗1, p
∗
2) satisfies
∂Utotal
∂pi
(p∗1, p
∗
2) = D
∗ − d(p∗1 + p∗2) = 0 for i = 1, 2,
4which yields p∗ := p∗1 + p
∗
2 = D0/(2d). The demand at equilibrium is then D
∗ = D0/2, greater than in the
non-cooperative setting. The overall utility U∗total = D
2
0/(4d) is also greater than D
2
0/(4.5d) for the competitive
case. Assuming both players share this revenue equally (trivially, the Shapley values are {1/2, 1/2} in this case),
the utility per player becomes
U∗i =
D20
8d
, (4)
which is greater than in the competitive case. So, both players benefit from this coalition.
III. SIDE-PAYMENTS UNDER COMPETITION
Let us suppose now that there are side payments between ISP1 and CP2 at (usage-based) price ps. The revenues
of the providers become:
U1 = D (p1 + ps) (5)
U2 = D (p2 − ps) (6)
Note that ps can be positive (ISP1 charges CP2 for “transit” costs) or negative (CP2 charges ISP1, e.g., for copyright
remuneration8). It is expected that ps is not a decision variable of the players, since their utilities are monotonic in
ps and the player without control would likely set (usage-priced) demand to zero to avoid negative utility. That is,
ps would normally be regulated and we will consider it as a fixed parameter in the following (with |ps| ≤ pmax).
First, if |ps| ≤ 13pmax, the equilibrium prices are given by
p∗1 =
1
3
pmax − ps
p∗2 =
1
3
pmax + ps
but demand D∗ = D0/3 and utilities
U∗i =
D20
9d
are exactly the same as (3) in the competitive setting with no side payment. Therefore, though setting ps > 0 at
first seems to favor ISP1 over CP2, it turns out to have no effect on equilibrium revenues for both providers.
Alternatively, if ps ≥ 13pmax, a boundary Nash equilibrium is reached when p∗1 = 0 and p∗2 = 12 (pmax + ps),
which means ISP1 does not charge usage-based fees to its consumers. Demand becomes D∗ = 12 (D0 − dps), and
utilities are
U∗1 =
(D0 − dps)dps
2d
U∗2 =
(D0 − dps)2
4d
Though p∗1 = 0, U
∗
1 is still strictly positive, with revenues for ISP1 coming from side-payments (and possibly from
flat-rate monthly fees as well). Furthermore, ps ≥ 13pmax ⇔ dps ≥ 12 (D0 − dps), which means U∗1 ≥ U∗2 : in this
8In France, a new law has been proposed recently to allow download of unauthorized copyright content, and in return be charged proportionally
to the volume of the download.
5setting, ISP1’s best move is to set his usage-based price to zero (to increase demand), while he is sure to achieve
better revenue than CP2 through side-payments.
Finally, if ps < − 13pmax, the situation is similar to the previous case (with −ps instead of ps). So, here p∗2 = 0
and p∗1 =
1
2 (pmax − ps), leading to U∗2 ≥ U∗1 .
To remind, herein revenues Ui are assumed usage-based, which means there could also be flat-rate charges in
play to generate revenue for either party. Studies of flat-rate compare to usage-based pricing schemes can be found
in the literature, see, e.g., [8].
IV. ADVERTISING REVENUES
We suppose now that CP2 has an additional source of (usage-based) revenue from advertising that amounts to
Dpa. Here pa is not a decision variable but a fixed parameter.9
A. Competition
The utilities for ISP1 and CP2 are now:
U1 = [D0 − d · (p1 + p2)] (p1 + ps) (7)
U2 = [D0 − d · (p1 + p2)] (p2 − ps + pa) (8)
Here, the Nash equilibrium prices are:
p∗1 =
1
3
pmax − ps + 1
3
pa
p∗2 =
1
3
pmax + ps − 2
3
pa
The cost to users is thus p∗ = 23pmax − 13pa while demand is D∗ = 13 (D0 + dpa). Nash equilibrium utilities are
given by
U∗i =
(D0 + dpa)
2
9d
for i = 1, 2, (9)
which generalizes equation (3) and shows how advertising revenue quadratically raises players’ utilities.
B. Collaboration
The overall income for cooperating providers is
Utotal = (D0 − dp)(p+ pa). (10)
So, solving the associated NEP equation yields
p∗ =
pmax − pa
2
. (11)
9 One may see pa as the result of an independent game between CP2 and his advertising sources, the details of which are out of the scope
of this paper.
6The NEP demand is then D∗ = (D0 + dpa)/2, and the total revenue at Nash equilibrium is U∗total = (D0 +
dpa)
2/(4d). Assuming this revenue is split equally between the two providers, we get for each provider the
equilibrium utility
U∗i =
(D0 + dpa)
2
8d
, (12)
which generalizes equation (4). As before, providers and users are better off when they cooperate.
Thus, we see that pa > 0 leads to lower prices, increased demand and more revenue for both providers
(i.e., including ISP1).
V. ISP PROVIDING MULTIPLE SERVICE CLASSES
In this section, we suppose ISP1 is offering two types of network access service: a low-quality one l at price pl,
and a high-quality one h at price ph ≥ pl. The role of multiple service classes in a neutral network has previously
been explored, e.g., in [9]. Here, we split the demand D into Dl and Dh: D = Dl+Dh (we will describe later how
we implement the dichotomy between Dl and Dh). For now, assume the overall demand still has a linear response
profile, i.e.,
D = D0 − d( pl + ph︸ ︷︷ ︸
formerly p1
+p2). (13)
First, we make reasonable assumptions on Dl:
1) Pricing incentives: Define ∆p := ph − pl. ∆p is an incentive for consumers to chose between classes l and
h: the higher ∆p is, the more likely users are to select l. Thus, if we take x := 1/∆p and y := Dl/D, we
may see y as a function of x and model this pricing response with the following properties:
y′(x) ≤ 0 (Dl increases with ∆p) (14)
y(0) = 1 (Dl ↑ D as ∆p ↑ ∞) (15)
y(∞) = 0 (Dl ↓ 0 as ∆p ↓ 0) (16)
2) Congestion incentives: As Dl approaches D, we assume congestion occurs in the low-quality network, further
deterring users to chose it. This motivates the additional assumption that
|y′(x)| ↓ 0 as x ↓ 0, (17)
that is, Dl decelerates as it gets closer to D.
Define
δ :=
∆p
γpmax
, (18)
where γ > 0 is an additional users’ price-sensitivity parameter. The following demand relation satisfies all conditions
(14), (15), (16) and (17):
Dl :=
(
1− e−δ)D. (19)
7The providers’ utilities are then:
U1 = Dlpl +Dhph = D
(
pl + ∆pe
−δ) (20)
U2 = Dp2 (21)
A. Collaboration
If both players cooperate, their overall utility is
Utotal = D
(
p2 + pl + ∆pe
−δ) .
There is no NEP with strictly positive prices pi ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2. To specify the boundary NEP (where at least one
usage-based price is zero), define
φ(x) := (1− x)e−x
and note that φ is a bijection of [0, 1].
• If p2 = 0, NEP conditions imply
δ∗ = φ−1(1/2)
p∗l =
1
3
(
1
2
− γδe−δ
)
pmax
Utility at the NEP is therefore
U∗total =
D20
9d
[
1
2
+ 2γδe−δ
]
.
[
2 +
(
2e−δ − 3) δγ] (22)
In this setting, the value of Utotal is upper bounded by ≈ 0.162D
2
0
d which is achieved when γ ≈ 1.53 (recall
that γ is not a decision variable).
• If pl = 0, then ph = 0 and p2 = 12pmax, yielding
Utotal =
D20
4d
. (23)
Hence, irrespective of consumers’ sensitivity γ to the price gap ∆p, the best solution for the coalition is to set-up
usage-based pricing for content only, at price p2 = pmax/2, while network access is subject only to flat-rate pricing
(pl = ph = 0).
B. Splitting Demand-Response Coefficient
Now consider splitting the demand-response coefficient d into dl, dh and d2, that is:
D = D0 − dlpl − dhph − d2p2. (24)
If
d2 = dl + dh, (25)
8then the interior equilibrium conditions ∇Utotal = ~0 yield:
δ = φ−1(dh/d2)
pl + p2 =
D0
2d2
− δ∆p0
2
(
dh
d2
+ e−δ
)
When the demand-response coefficients satisfy (25), we have an equilibrium line. Vector field plots of Utotal suggest
it is attractive (see Figure 1). In this particular setting, providers can thus reach U∗total with usage-based pricing.
Fig. 1. Attraction of the equilibrium line.
However, if d2 6= dl + dh, there exists a line of attraction, but with a non-null gradient on it driving players
toward border equilibria. Hence, the conclusion of subsection V-A also holds in this more generalized setting.
C. Competition
When ISP1 and CP2 compete, again there is no interior NEP (with all prices pi strictly positive). In fact, the
condition ∇pl,phU1 = ~0 implies pl = 0 = ph and D = 0, so ISP1 has to relax condition ∂U1∂pl = 0 by setting
pl = 0 (i.e., only flat-rate pricing for the best-effort service l). The solution to the two remaining Nash equilibrium
conditions is then:
p2 =
1
4
[√
9γ2 + 2γ + 1− 3γ + 1
]
· pmax (26)
ph =
γ
2
√
9γ2 + 2γ + 1− 3γ + 2 · pmax (27)
By defining f2(γ) := p2/pmax and fh(γ) := ph/pmax, we then have
U∗1 (γ) = fh(γ) · (1− fh(γ)− f2(γ))D0pmax
U∗2 (γ) = f2(γ) · (1− fh(γ)− f2(γ))D0pmax
Figure 2 shows utilities at equilibrium (as fractions of D0pmax). We see that, in any case, CP2 has the advantage
in this game: U∗2 is always greater to U
∗
1 , irrespective of consumers’ sensitivity γ to usage-based prices.
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Fig. 2. Utilities as functions of users’ sensitivity to usage-based pricing.
Here, γ → 0 means users are so sensitive to any usage-based price that they will always choose the best-effort
service (which is subject to flat-rate pricing). Users’ price sensitivity decreases as γ increases, the limit γ → ∞
corresponding to the setting of section II with limγ→∞ U∗i (γ) =
D20
9d .
VI. MULTIPLE CPS PROVIDING THE SAME TYPE OF CONTENT
Now suppose there are multiple CPs supplying the same type of content (e.g., competing online encyclopedias),
so users choose one CP over another based only on price.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the case with two CPs denoted by CP2 and CP3. First, let us remark
that if there is a significant difference between the prices p2 of CP2 and p3 of CP3, since both provide the same
type of content, all consumers are likely to shift to the cheapest provider, leading us back to our initial model with
one ISP and one CP.
So the difference introduced by multiple CPs may arise when p2 ≈ p3. Suppose that, initially,
p2 = p¯ = p3.
In this case, we assume customers are evenly shared between CP2 and CP3, so that
Ui =
1
2
D(p1, p¯)p¯ for i = 2, 3,
where D(p1, pi) := D0 − d(p1 + pi) is the demand-reponse to the usage-based prices p1 (for network access) and
pi (for content).
Now, if CPi reduces its price by some small δpi, some of its opponent’s consumers will change CP, but not all of
them since a small price gap may not convince them to go. This behavior is known as customer stickiness, inertia
or loyalty. To model it we rewrite Ui as
Ui = s(pi, p5−i)D(p1, pi)pi for i = 2, 3, (28)
10
where p5−i denotes the usage-based price of the other CP, and the “stickiness” function s has the following
properties:
s(x, y) ≥ 0, (29)
s(x, x) =
1
2
, (30)
s(x, y) + s(y, x) = 1. (31)
When CPi reduces its price by δpi, the first-order variation in its utility is given by ∂Ui∂pi (p¯, p¯)δpi. From (28) and
(31),
∂Ui
∂pi
(p¯, p¯) =
[
∂s
∂x
(p¯, p¯) +
pmax − p1 − 2p¯
2p¯(pmax − p1 − p¯)
]
D(p1, p¯)p¯.
(Where pmax was defined as D0d .) Thus, taking consumers loyalty into consideration, the Nash equilibrium condition
for either CPi becomes:
∂s
∂x
(p¯, p¯) +
pmax − p1 − 2p¯
2p¯(pmax − p1 − p¯) = 0. (32)
A. Stickiness Model 1
As a first, simple loyalty model, suppose that after CPi reduces its price by δpi, the fraction of users that remain
with the other CP(5− i) is inversely proportional to its price p5−i, i.e., the stickiness function is
s(pi, p5−i) :=
1/pi
1/pi + 1/p5−i
=
p5−i
pi + p5−i
. (33)
In this setting, equilibrium condition (32) becomes p¯ = 13 (pmax − p1), while equilibrium condition for ISP1 is
p1 =
1
2 (pmax − p¯). Thus, prices at the NEP are p∗1 = 25pmax and p¯∗ = 15pmax. Demand at equilibrium is D∗ = 2D05d
and the revenue of each provider is
U∗1 =
4
25
Umax, (34)
U∗i =
1
25
Umax for i = 2, 3. (35)
We see that, compared to (3), ISP1 highly benefits from the competition between CPs (his revenue is about 44%
higher). The situation would be symmetric with a single CP and two competing ISPs.
B. Stickiness Model 2
One can consider another loyalty model where the fraction of users remaining with CP−i is proportional to the
price slackness pmax − p5−i, i.e., the stickiness function is
s(pi, p5−i) :=
pmax − pi
(pmax − pi) + (pmax − p5−i)
Here condition (32) becomes 2(pmax − p¯)(pmax − p1 − 2p¯) = p¯(pmax − p1 − p¯), while equilibrium condition for
ISP1 is still 2p1 + p¯ = pmax. Resolution of this system leads to p∗1 =
5
14pmax and p¯
∗ = 27pmax. At the NEP, demand
11
is thus D∗ = 514D0 and utilities are
U∗1 =
25
196
Umax ≈ 0.12Umax,
U∗i =
10
196
Umax ≈ 0.051Umax for i = 2, 3.
We see with this second setting that the outcome of the price war between CPs and ISP1 significantly depends on
the customer inertia model used.
C. Stickiness with side-payments
Now focusing on the first stickiness model (33) and update the model to take into account usage-based side
payments ps. The revenues become
U1 = D(p1 + ps),
Ui = s(pi, p5−i)D(pi − ps) for i = 2, 3.
For same-priced CPs, solving ∂Ui∂pi (p¯, p¯) = 0 (with non-nul demand), we find that the equilibrium conditions are
(p¯− ps)(pmax − p1 + p¯) = 2p¯(pmax − p1 − p¯),
2p1 = pmax − p¯− ps.
They are now quadratic in p¯, thus, for the sake of readability, let us define
η := ps/pmax, and
ψ(η) :=
√
1 + 28η + 36η2.
When ps > 0 (side payments from the CPs to the ISP), resolution of this system for positive prices lead us to:
p¯∗ =
pmax
10
(1 + 4η + ψ(η))
p∗1 =
pmax
20
(9− 14η − ψ(η))
Then, demand at the NEP is D∗ = D020 (9 + 6η − ψ(η)) while revenues are
U∗1 =
Umax
400
(9 + 6η − ψ(η))2 (36)
U∗i =
Umax
100
(2− 19η − 18η2 + (2 + 3η)ψ(η)) (37)
What is interesting here is that both utilities are monotone in η (see Figure 3): U∗1 decreases while U
∗
i increases
with η (when ps  pmax, we fall back to the results (34) and (35) of subsection VI-A). Paradoxically enough, we
see that increasing ps (which means more usage-based side payments for ISP1) is disadvantageous for ISP1 but
benefits the CPs! This situation is very different from the one in section III, where the ISP was favored over the
CP when η was over a fixed threshold.
When ps < 0, CPs receive usage-based side payments from ISP1 (ostensibly for royalties of copyrighted content).
12
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Fig. 3. Revenues at the NEP as functions of η := ps/pmax.
If ps ≤ −7+2
√
10
18 pmax, then
∂Ui
∂pi
(p¯, p¯) is always negative and p¯ will tend to zero. This means that the best strategy
for CPs is to offer their content only for a flat rate, thus increasing demand and making all their usage-based profits
on side payments.
Otherwise, if ps > −7+2
√
10
18 pmax, then condition (32) has two solutions:
p¯0 =
1
10
(4η + 1− ψ(η))pmax,
p¯1 =
1
10
(4η + 1 + ψ(η))pmax.
There are therefore two equilibria:
• p¯∗ = p¯1 and p∗1 =
1
20 (−14η + 9 − ψ(η)): this is the case we studied in the ps > 0 setting, demand and
revenues at the NEP are unchanged. This equilibrium is “stable” in the sense that10 ∂Ui∂pi (p¯1−, p¯1−) > 0 and
∂Ui
∂pi
(p¯1+, p¯1+) < 0 for i ∈ {2, 3}: if CPs move slightly their prices around p¯∗ = p¯1, they are incented to
move back.
• p¯∗ = p¯0 and p∗1 =
1
20 (−14η+ 9 +ψ(η)): in this case, demand at equilibrium is D∗ = D020 (9 + 6η+ψ(η)) and
revenues are given by
U∗1 =
Umax
400
(9 + 6η + ψ(η))2, (38)
U∗i =
Umax
100
(2− 19η − 18η2 − (2 + 3η)ψ(η)). (39)
However, this equilibrium is “unstable” in the sense that ∂Ui∂pi (p¯1−, p¯1−) < 0 and ∂Ui∂pi (p¯1+, p¯1+) > 0: if CPs
shift their prices from p¯∗ = p¯0, they are incented to shift even more, which will lead them either to the other
equilibrium or to p¯ = 0 (again, no usage-based pricing for content, but there may additional revenue from
flat-rate fees as well).
10Recall that we restrict our attention to p2 ≈ p3.
13
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Fig. 4. Revenues at the unstable NEP as functions of η.
The ISP is better off at this new NEP (see Figure 4): regarless of the (regulated) value of ps, his revenue is
always higher here (and the CPs’ revenues are always lower) than at the other NEP. This fact is consistent with
the “unstability” we observed: if the CPs happen to leave this equilibrium, they are not incented to come back.
A similar story follows if one considers multiple competing ISPs with one CP. Also, taking advertising revenues
into consideration will complicate the above computations and affect the location and “stability” of the NEPs.
VII. STACKELBERG EQUILIBRIUM
Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to asymmetric competition in which one competitor is the leader and the
other a follower. Actions are no longer taken independently: the leader takes action first, and then the follower
reacts.
Though the dynamics of the games are different from the previous study, equations (7) and (8) still hold, with
fixed pa ≥ 0 and regulated ps. In the following, we need to assume that
ps ≤ 1
2
pmax +
1
2
pa
pa ≤ 1
3
pmax +
1
4
ps
so that NEPs are reachable with positive prices.
If ISP1 sets p1, then CP2’s optimal move is to set
p2 =
1
2
(−p1 + pmax + ps − pa).
This expression yields D = d2 (pmax− p1− ps + pa) and U1 = d2 (pmax− p1− ps + pa)(p1 + ps). Anticipating CP2’s
reaction in trying to optimize U1, the best move for ISP1 is thus to set
p∗1 =
1
2
pmax − ps + 1
2
pa,
14
which yields
p∗2 =
1
4
pmax + ps − 3
4
pa.
Therefore, when ISP1 is the leader, at the NEP demand is D∗ = 14 (D0 + dpa) and utilities are:
U∗1 =
1
8d
(D0 + dpa)
2, (40)
U∗2 =
1
16d
(D0 + dpa)
2. (41)
Suppose now that CP2 is the leader and sets p2 first. Similarly, we find:
p∗2 =
1
2
pmax + ps − 1
2
pa
p∗1 =
1
4
pmax − ps + 1
4
pa
These values yield the same cost p∗ and demand D∗ for the internauts at the NEP, while providers’ utilities become:
U∗1 =
1
16d
(D0 + dpa)
2, (42)
U∗2 =
1
8d
(D0 + dpa)
2. (43)
Therefore, in either case of leader-follower dynamics, the leader obtains twice the utility of the follower at the
NEP (yet, his revenue is not better than in the collaborative case).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND ON-GOING WORK
Using a simple model of linearly diminishing consumer demand as a function of usage-based price, we studied
a game between a monopolistic ISP and a CP under a variety of scenarios including consideration of: non-neutral
two-sided transit pricing (either CP2 participating in network costs or ISP1 paying for copyright remuneration),
advertising revenue, competition, cooperation and leadership.
In a basic model without side-payments and advertising revenues, both providers achieve the same utility at
equilibrium, and all actors are better off when they cooperate (higher demand and providers’ utility).
When regulated, usage-based side-payments ps come into play, the outcome depends on the value of |ps| compared
to the maximum usage-based price pmax consumers can tolerate:
• when |ps| ≤ 13pmax, providers shift their prices to fall back to the demand of the competitive setting with no
side-payments;
• when |ps| ≥ 13pmax, the provider receiving side payments sets its usage-based price to zero to increase demand,
while it is sure to be better off than his opponent.
When advertising revenues to the CP come into play, they increase the utilities of both providers by reducing
the overall usage-based price applied to the users. ISP1 and CP2 still share the same utility at equilibrium, and the
increase in revenue due to advertising is quadratic.
We considered in section V the implications of service differentiation from the ISP. In our model, when ISP1
and CP2 cooperate, the best solution for them is to set-up usage-based prices for content only and flat-rate pricing
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for network access. However, when providers do not cooperate, the ISP optimally offers its best-effort service for
a flat rate (zero usage-based cost), resulting in more usage-based revenue for the CP.
We considered in section VI a generalization of our model to non-monopolistic, competing CPs. For a simple
customer inertia model, we found that regulated side-payments had a significant impact on equilibrium revenues
for the ISP and the CPs:
• when side payments go to the access provider, his utility at the NEP diminishes, while
• when they go to the content providers, the three-player system has two equilibria: an unstable one in favor of
the ISP, and a stable one.
Under leader-follower dynamics, the leader obtains twice the utility of his follower at equilibrium; yet, he does
not achieve a better revenue than in the cooperative scenario.
In on-going work, we are exploring the effects of content-specific (i.e., not application neutral) pricing, including
multiple CPs providing different types of content.
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